Any poorly designed system is inconvenient or annoying to its users and those affected by its existence. In safety-critical applications, ill-conceived designs can be lethal as, by definition, failures have a safety implication.
INTRODUCTION
One reason for the relatively poor take-up to date of user centred design techniques within industrial practice is the way such techniques are often developed and transferred out to practitioners. Typically, a novel technique will be developed in a research setting, encapsulated within a new method and presented as a package to industrial designers.
Such an approach can only be practical and costeffective if the target design team includes suitably qualified members who are familiar with such techniques. Otherwise, it demands that practitioners learn new techniques and apply them as additional stages within the design process; this causes commercial problems by adding costs to the design and building delays into that process.
Another problem is that many evaluation techniques require a fairly mature design before they can be applied, usually requiring at least an interface prototype or mock-up to appraise. However, it is often in the earliest stages of design that key choices are made which shape the eventual system; such choices are usually the hardest or costliest to change.
Sometimes -notably for high reliability systemsdesigners may be required to provide documentation to demonstrate the reliability level of the system. This means that historically they may have been pushed towards a view of the 'system' as being hardware and software only -i.e. the system boundary is typically drawn around the components that are being explicitly designed. For interactive high reliability systems this has led to a downplaying of the role of the human operators -they are generally treated as being infallible in that it is assumed that they will always be capable of following any procedures that are laid down for them. The work reported here takes a wider view of 'system' as also including human operators.
Safety critical or dependable systems -systems where failures in the hardware, software or its use could result in a substantial loss of some kind -are a domain where user-centred design techniques may be particularly useful. Such systems are typically designed following a rigorous development process and practitioners have been extremely receptive to novel advances, such as formal specification techniques, which assist in better design.
A major part of the development process of such systems is safety engineering. This is an activity which permeates all phases of the system lifecycle, and seeks to ensure that the final system is as free from risk as possible, as described in section 3 below.
Such "safety assurance" starts at the very beginning of a new system's development by identifying requirements which any design must satisfy to meet the safety level desired for that system. However, typical user-focused analyses which occur when an interface has already been prototyped are often too late to help this work.
Thus to be able to specify meaningful safety requirements relating to the user, usability evaluation activity must be undertaken from the outset, even informing the design of the earliest prototype interface. Later inputs are unlikely to be as influential upon the design, and late discovery of usability problems can be costly.
In this presentation we discuss our experience of taking an alternative approach to transferring user-centred design issues into commercial design: extracting the essence of a technique and incorporating it into an existing engineering process.
In the sections that follow we describe the Programmable User Modelling (PUM) technique and why it was chosen for this work; the phases of safety engineering and how PUM can contribute to each of these; our experience applying this idea in practice; and finally how we intend to take this work further. PUM (Young et al, 1989 ) models the user as a problem solver of intentionally limited power, and is based on established theories of cognition. The approach is based on the premise that the user has knowledge about the current state of the system, about actions and their effects, and about the task. It also assumes that the user behaves rationally on the basis of what is known and what the current tasks are.
PROGRAMMABLE USER MODELLING
According to PUM, errors arise through the user having incomplete or incorrect knowledge. For example, a user may be expected to handle the hidden side effects of actions or hidden state changes. The user may be unable to predict the effects of actions adequately because of inappropriate presentation of information by the system. Thus PUM can be applied both for predicting likely rational interactive behaviours and for identifying sources of user error.
A PUM analysis usually follows a five stage procedure, described in Blandford et al, 1997 . The aim of an analysis is to provide the designer with a means of identifying minimal requirements on the user's knowledge and capabilities, and highlighting the problems which may arise from gaps or inaccuracies in that knowledge.
An important focus is consideration of how users know things. There are various ways in which a user may acquire knowledge about the system state, and users cannot know about aspects of system state without having some means of knowing them. Describing how users know various things may highlight sources of potential difficulty without need for further analysis.
As PUM involves producing a formal or rigorous analysis of user behaviour, it sits comfortably with the kinds of software engineering techniques already in use in a formal design process, and was seen as an ideal candidate for integration with safety engineering. 
OVERVIEW OF SAFETY ENGINEERING
The aim of safety engineering may be defined as to manage the introduction of a new or altered system into an environment, ensuring that this is "as free from risk as is reasonably practicable" (Praxis Critical Systems Limited, 1998).
Risk relates to the combination of the likelihood of an accident occurring and to the severity of the outcomes of such accidents, where an accident is defined as an unintended event which results in loss. Loss may include death, personal injury, and financial or other cost.
Safety engineering starts by considering the possible hazards of the new system, which are system states that can lead to an accident. A multi-disciplinary team of experts will meet and brainstorm using keyword prompts and checklists to try to identify possible hazards.
Safety engineers then conduct Causal Analysis, identifying cause-effect sequences of hazardous events, which are those events which may combine to cause the hazards identified above. They then carry out Consequence Analysis, considering the sequences of events that could lead from a hazard to an accident.
Working through this process, with appropriate iteration, the safety engineers prepare a Safety Case, an argument that the system is safe. This is argued by considering risks in three separate categories:
Firstly, intolerable risks, which are unacceptable under any circumstances. Safety engineers will explore ways of removing such risks or of drastically reducing their severity. The safety case needs to show that no such risks remain in the system Secondly, negligible risks, which are so small as to be insignificant, and no further precautions are considered necessary.
Finally, tolerable risks, those that are only considered acceptable because they confer a real benefit and the risk can be shown to have been reduced as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP).
This revolves around the balance between the cost of reducing the risk compared to the benefit this reduction would bring. The safety case would argue that the risk has been reduced ALARP, and show the benefit of allowing the risk at its given level.
Safety engineers deploy risk reduction measures by specifying mitigation strategies intended to reduce the likelihood that a hazard will result in an accident or reducing the severity of a possible accident.
Because of the number of experts who need to be consulted, the wide range of factors under consideration and the need for accuracy, safety engineering tends to be both costly and time consuming. As it is usually conducted within a commercial environment, any techniques which are to be added into this work must be cost and time effective, fitting within existing practice, and must be easy to learn and use.
THE APPROACH TO INTEGRATION
As noted in Blandford et al (1998) , it is time consuming both to learn to apply cognitively based techniques and to actually apply them in practice. They also do not usually fit easily into an existing process such as Railtrack's ESM System (1998).
We set out to adapt PUM such that it would be capable of making serious contributions to design at the earliest stages and with low time and cost overheads. Our approach was fairly simple: we extracted the "essences" of PUM analyses so that they could be fully incorporated into the existing process.
In the following we consider the phases of Safety Engineering and describe how PUM applies to each.
Hazard Identification
The three knowledge questions described earlier can be added to the keywords and checklists used by safety engineers already during the hazard identification brainstorming meetings to widen the issues considered to include those relating to users' knowledge.
Consequence Analysis
Escalation barriers are put in place to prevent hazards resulting in accidents, and the knowledge questions can be used to consider whether users will realise that a hazard exists and know the correct action to take, and hence whether an intended barrier will actually be effective.
Causal Analysis
Examining the knowledge needed by a user to accomplish a task correctly and to consider the effects of each piece of knowledge being missing or incorrect can assist in the setting of the safety requirements for the system.
Loss analysis.
The knowledge questions can help in the elicitation of information from domain experts by posing pertinent questions about possible accident scenarios when estimating the resultant losses.
Options analysis.
Proposed alternative solutions for risk reduction can be examined to consider how they may remove identified knowledge problems and hence reduce the likelihood of certain hazards.
4.6 Impact analysis. This is beyond our scope as it involves calculating the reduction in loss from adopting the proposed risk reduction strategies, although a contribution toward this would have been made during 4.5 above.
Demonstration of compliance and ALARP.
Can risks relating to user knowledge practicably be reduced further by amendments to the user interface/operating procedures? How effective are the existing operatordependent related risk reduction measures?
In the next section we describe how we carried out this work in practice.
THE PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
Working closely with Praxis Critical Systems Limited, we were involved in the safety engineering which formed part of the initial design phase of a major communications system. This system is commercially sensitive, so we present only generalised descriptions of how our inputs influenced each stage.
Over a three month period of "live" work a PUM analyst (the first author) participated as a full member of the safety engineering team in analysing the system to derive safety requirements. The engineers then delivered their work, including the human factors inputs, to the client. This work had to meet very tight deadlines, and there was no opportunity to complete analyses "off-line" in the way that human factors issues are often undertaken.
In the following sections we describe how we were actually able to contribute to the first three stages of the safety engineering work.
Hazard Identification
General human factors issues were considered in the initial Hazard Identification brainstorming meetings. During the analysis of these meetings the PUM analyst was able to assist in finding plausible matches between human factors issues raised and identified hazards.
Consequence Analysis
The PUM analyst was able to raise human factors issues which led directly to safety requirements regarding the content of and procedures relating to messages which may be sent using various methods to be supported by the system.
Causal Analysis
The safety engineers used a scale of likelihood estimates, ranging from "improbable" to "frequent", to assess frequencies of hazards occurring. The PUM analyst was able to use this scale to estimate the frequency of each knowledge problem arising.
Thus we were able to assist the safety engineers to identify specific safety requirements for the proposed system relating to user knowledge issues.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
We undertook this work with unrestricted access to a safety engineering team, working to their deadlines in a commercial setting. We worked with them in realtime, delivering analyses of issues as they arose, and suggesting issues and problems which may otherwise have been ignored. This was very much 'action research', so it was not possible to provide an experimental control to enable us to clearly identify the effect of our input. Instead we must rely upon the subjective view of the safety engineering team. The main safety engineer believes that our inputs resulted in "more extensive" safety requirements for this system than they would have otherwise derived. The same engineer also expressed the view that he would be able to use the knowledge questions to take account of "human knowledge factors" in future safety engineering work having participated with the PUM analyst.
While this belief has yet to be tested, it is encouraging -Buckingham Shum & Hammond (1994) discuss some of the difficulties of transferring ideas and experience between researchers and practitioners. The work here was in the style of what Collins & Brown (1988) term 'cognitive apprenticeship' -the PUM analyst prepared himself to participate as a full member of the design team, did all the human factors work in the team context within existing practice, enabling other team members to observe and relate to the analyses.
Several factors for success became evident during this work.
Firstly, all parties involved were strongly committed to making this a success. The safety engineers were actively seeking to use human factors inputs to strengthen their work, and the PUM analyst undertook introductory training that enabled him to operate efficiently within the team. Secondly, the system being considered was highly interactive, and it was easy to generate quick analyses of appropriate "scenarios of use" -these attributes lent the system to a PUM style of analysis. Thus, the technique applied adopts an approach that fits well with that taken in safety engineering.
Finally, effort was focused on the outcome, not on the analyses, in order to meet the project deadlines. This gave a rationale for a streamlined approach, distilling the most important aspects of the PUM without exposing the rest of the safety team to unnecessary or distracting side-issues.
We firmly believe that these factors need to be taken into account in other work that seeks to strengthen the human factors element of design practice.
This "distillation" of an evaluation technique does risk losing some of the original's power, but the full technique can still be used at a later stage when a mature design is emerging, if deemed appropriate. In the commercial situation we faced, our necessarily succinct approach was the only practicable one -work had to be completed to a high standard whilst observing commercial constraints and meeting the project timetable. In other design environments, where the process or deadlines allow more flexibility, it may be possible to apply additional procedures as new phases in a design process, for example undertaking a full PUM analysis effort or using a technique such as THEA (Fields et al, 1997) .
We are now exploring how to transfer the skills needed to conduct such analyses to safety engineers to explore the practicality of taking this approach without having a human factors expert within the safety team.
